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Preparing Negotiations in Services: 
EC Audiovisuals in the Doha Round 
Patrick A. Messerlin and Emmanuel Cocq
Introduction
Under the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement, only nineteen WTO mem-
bers have made commitments in audiovisual services in their GATS
schedule (see table 7). 
As illustrated in table 7, these commitments are generally of limited
scope and magnitude.1 Among the large audiovisual producers, only the
United States has taken substantial commitments at the various stages of
audiovisual production, distribution, and transmission. Although more
limited, the commitments by India (the world’s largest film producer),
Hong Kong, and Japan show the acceptance by countries with large pro-
duction and influential cultures to consider the issue of liberalization in
audiovisual services with an open mind. The rest of the WTO members,
led by the EC, have severely limited the access to their markets because
they are insecure about the ability of their audiovisual industry to com-
pete, they want to minimize the exposure of their people to foreign influ-
ence (France), or they want to use audiovisual services as an instrument
for building their national identity (Australia and Canada).
If negotiations for services followed the same pattern as those for goods,
WTO negotiators would try to solve such conflicting approaches among
WTO members by striking intersectoral trade-offs. For instance, the EC water
utilities or Canadian lumber firms would lobby their own authorities for
removing EC or Canadian barriers in audiovisuals (as concessions to be
granted for getting better access to U.S. water or lumber markets), whereas
the U.S. audiovisual services sector would lobby the U.S. government for the
opening of maritime transportation (as concessions to be traded for getting
better access to EC or Canadian audiovisual markets). However, these inter-
sectoral trade-offs may be a component of WTO negotiations in services, but
probably not to the same extent as in goods. As a result, the inclusion of
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audiovisuals as one of the services to be liberalized during the Doha Round
has so far been received by skepticism in WTO circles.
However, there are good reasons for optimism, as stressed in the post-
script (see page 54), and recent developments in audiovisuals have con-
firmed this view. Optimism flows from ongoing profound economic
changes, partly driven by technological changes. These changes are largely
TABLE 7
SUMMARY OF SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS IN AUDIOVISUAL SERVICES
UNDER THE URUGUAY ROUND
Countries
Large producers (by decreasing number of films produced)        
India X    1   
United States X X X X X X 6   
Hong Kong X    X X 3   
Japan X X   X  3  
Smaller producers          
Central African Republic X X X X X X 6  
Dominican Republic X  X 2   
El Salvador    X  X 2   
Gambia X X X X   4   
Israel X      1   
Kenya X X     2   
Korea X    X  2   
Lesotho X X X X   4   
Malaysia X   X   2   
Mexico X X     2   
New Zealand X X X X  X 5   
Nicaragua X X     2   
Panama X X X  X  4   
Singapore X    X  2   
Thailand X  X   2  
Total 17 10 7 8 7 6 55  
SOURCE: World Trade Organization, Audiovisual Services, Table 9 S/C/W/40 (Geneva: WTO, 1998).
NOTE: CPC: Central Product Classification.
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procompetitive and require larger markets, including in the EC, which is
the focus here. Meanwhile, the highly protective European Common
Audiovisual Policies (CAPs) increasingly show the same fatigue as EC
agricultural policy—broadly for the same reasons—and face a significant
erosion of public support. All these converging forces make the option of
market opening in the audiovisual services sector increasingly attractive.
Audiovisuals in the Doha Round: Mission Impossible?
Reciprocity—the traditional negotiating tool in trade rounds—will be of
limited use for services, including audiovisuals. First, it cannot be easily
measured. Negotiators have no tools to assess whether liberalizing audio-
visual services will be worth roughly the same value as, for example, lib-
eralizing maritime transport or water utilities. (In the case of goods,
evaluating the concessions received and granted relies on the tariff reduc-
tions received and granted, weighted by the trade values involved.) 
Second, reciprocity has a much vaguer meaning in services than in goods.
Removing a tariff is often enough to change substantially pricing behav-
ior, entry, and exit in product markets. This is not necessarily the case for 
services, for which liberalization requires deep domestic regulatory reforms.
Difficulties for negotiators do not start with considerations about cul-
ture. They emerge in the very first steps of evaluating the concessions
offered by the various trading partners, and they are common to all serv-
ices. For instance, reliable data on imports require “rules of origin,”
which allow a clear distinction between imported and domestic products
and between products imported from different countries. Such a concept
is not easily applicable to all services, including audiovisual services. For
instance, defining a “domestic” film is not a simple matter, and differ-
ences in definitions can lead to huge differences when assessing the scope
and evolution of the audiovisual services sector. The French Centre
National de la Cinématographie (CNC) has three alternative rules of ori-
gin for defining French films: “French-initiative films,” which include
“100 percent French films” and “French majority co-productions”;
“Foreign majority co-productions”; and “approved films.” From 1997 to
2001, an average of 108 films were produced under the narrower defini-
tion (100 percent French films) and an average of 150 films were produced
under the wider definition (approved films). Rules of origin are so complex
that they can easily lead to arbitrary decisions, recently illustrated by The
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Fifth Element, which was defined as an integrally French movie because it
had been largely financed by a French studio. However, it was shot in
London and in English, and employed many non-French actors—all
infringements to normal conditions for obtaining status as an integrally
French movie (in fact, there is an ongoing legal suit against this decision
to grant French origin).
Moreover, negotiations in audiovisual services present specific obsta-
cles, the most prominent being the strong link perceived between audio-
visual services and “national culture” by many GATS members. However,
the paradox is that the existing regulatory policies that allegedly support
national culture tend to harm it profoundly. For instance, the French
audiovisual policy has strongly induced French filmmakers to mimic U.S.
filmmakers, leading to an accelerated “Americanization” of French cul-
ture. The fact that this paradox is increasingly perceived in Europe
removes an obstacle to liberalization.
In such a delicate context, negotiators will be strongly pressured by
audiovisual firms, which are very diverse. Whereas some of these companies
operate almost exclusively in the audiovisual services sector of their coun-
tries (such as publicly owned audiovisual firms), others have internal poten-
tial sectoral trade-offs. For example, Bertelsmann is a large German-based
press firm that owns a large audiovisual services sector in several OECD
countries. The same could still be said for Vivendi, a French firm, although
there are doubts about the long-term sustainability of its strategy.
Technological and Economic Changes: The Quantum Project2
Technology is profoundly changing audiovisual markets, inducing the
most dynamic EC firms to make drastic revisions to their strategies—to
the point of being much more open to unilateral regulatory reforms.
Following is a quick survey of these changes.
As is well known, technical progress in telecoms is generating profound
changes in audiovisuals, and this convergence process is far from over. The
digital revolution in telecoms will reduce a government’s ability to protect
domestic audiovisual markets. For instance, the EC quota on non-European
movies on TV (40 percent of all broadcast movies) will become obsolete
when EC TV viewers are able to download movies at a reasonable cost from
a satellite dish through the Internet or from terrestrial digital TV, allowing
free cross-border diffusion between EC member states. New technology
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will make it possible for each EC broadcaster to fulfill the current obliga-
tion of permanently supplying 40 percent of domestic films (if only by buy-
ing audiovisual flops produced in large quantities by the massive subsidies
available in the CAPs), whereas European TV viewers will download only
foreign films supplied by this company.
Technological change has generated economic changes. It has forced EC
firms willing to survive as world players to reassess the contours of the 
markets relevant to them and to realize that they are too small in global
markets. Table 8 shows that in 1997 the average size (in terms of audiovi-
sual turnover) of the twenty-three largest EC firms was half the average size
of the fifteen largest U.S. firms.
Size matters in the audiovisual services sector because it is one of the
riskiest parts of a modern economy. A large firm can implement several
strategies of risk management more easily than a smaller firm. These
strategies can include launching several films (hoping that the profitable
ones will compensate for the losses of the others); releasing films on
video, DVD, and other formats; and marketing brands by using the same
concept in, for example, a film, a TV series, a book, a magazine, clothes,
and toys (to increase revenues).
Table 8 suggests that EC firms are significantly more specialized in audio-
visual services and hence more fragile during the inevitable downturns. It
also suggests that EC firms tend to be smaller and less diversified in the EC
member states enforcing the most restrictive CAPs. This correlation mirrors
a true causality. Most EC protectionist measures in audiovisual services have
consisted of taxing consumers or creating monopolies—two sure recipes for
inhibiting market growth. The more strictly the CAPs have been enforced,
the more the markets have been severely segmented and restrained, or
balkanized, and the smaller the EC firms have tended to be. Moreover, the
fact that size counts much less for “cultural” films and TV shows (such works
tend to require less funds, making their risks more easily bearable) implies
that most EC firms are too small for entertainment and too big for culture.
However, because EC audiovisual firms tend to be monopolies in mem-
ber state markets, they have become the target of the European competi-
tion authorities for “abuse of dominant power.” Mergers in EC audiovisual
services represent 2 percent of the total number of EC mergers, but the
ban of mergers in audiovisual services by EC competition authorities
amounts to half of all the merger bans decided. Similar observations can
be made at the member state level. For instance, the largest French firm
(Canal Plus) was fined for excessive market power in film catalogue (the
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list of films on which it can levy fees for intellectual property rights)
because (in accordance with the existing audiovisual regulations) the rel-
evant market has been defined by the French competition authorities 
as the French-speaking film market, that is, 40 percent of the French 
market—a small proportion of an already relatively small market by world
TABLE 8
COMPARISONS OF LEADING U.S. AND EC AUDIOVISUAL FIRMS, 1996–1997
1997/
Country 1996 1997 1997 1996 1997 1997 1997 1997        
The 23 European firms among the 50 leading world firms        
Austria      
(1 firm) 942 818 818 --13.2 100.0 26.5 3.2 101.0
Britain    
(7 firms) 14,927 27,081 17,170 15.0 63.4 1,504.3 8.8 293.5
France      
(4 firms) 6,085 5,896 5,602 --7.9 95.0 353.1 6.3 96.4
Germany      
(7 firms)a 19,177 27,872 18,904 --1.4 67.8 1,169.8 6.2 230.8
Italy      
(2 firms) 5,049 4,855 4,855 --3.8 100.0 476.8 9.8 84.9
Luxembourg
(1 firm) 2,683 3,189 2,910 8.5 91.3 --80.6 --2.8 nsb
Netherlandsc
(1 firm) 5,628 5,686 5,686 1.0 100.0 403.3 7.1 277.4
All  54,491 75,397 55,945 2.7 74.2 3,853.2 6.9 196.6
All in 1996
(23 firms) 53,356 72,890 54,269 1.7 74.5 3,234.9 6.0 190.7
The 15 U.S. firms among the 50 leading world firms         
All  64,557 230,583 73,491 13.8 31.9 14,009.4 19.1 279.4  
All in 1996   
(13 firms) 49,055 95,365 63,416 29.3 66.5 4,653.2 7.3 241.1
SOURCE: European Audiovisual Observatory, Statistical Yearbook 1999 (Strasbourg, France), 69.
a. Net results are not available for Kirch, RTL, and SAT1. 
b. Not significant. 
c. Including Belgian Flemish-speaking population.
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standards. In summary, EC firms have been kept smaller than they could
have been because CAPs balkanize national markets.
Despite their small size and their inability to grow because of market
balkanization, EC audiovisual firms have been a good buy for other
firms because of their monopoly rents. Most of them have thus become
integrated in companies involved in other activities, for instance, press
and publishing (Bertelsmann, Canal Plus-Havas, Fininvest, and Kirch),
advertising (Canal Plus-Havas and Fininvest), insurance (Fininvest),
telecoms (Bertelsmann), and utilities (Canal Plus-Vivendi).
The recent integration of EC audiovisual firms in larger firms with a
wider set of production activities is dramatically changing the balance of
coalitions that could support the Doha Round. Being a profound departure
from the traditional European scheme of public monopolies highly spe-
cialized in audiovisual services, it is likely to influence the debate about cul-
ture in two ways. First, it enlarges the vision about “cultural goods,”
fudging the economically wrong (but politically powerful) debate about
trade balances. For instance, today, the negative EC trade balance in films
is a powerful argument for protection (even though economically it does
not make sense). A wider view about all cultural goods produced by firms
like Bertelsmann or Vivendi will balance the negative EC trade balance in
films by the positive EC trade balance in books or magazines, helping to
diffuse the pressures on cultural protection. Second, EC firms looking for
access to foreign markets for their nonaudiovisual activities will be less hos-
tile to the opening of EC audiovisual markets. Most of the large European
groups owning audiovisual firms are in such a situation.
Audiovisual Services in the EC: Titanic
This section provides a brief survey of the main instruments—quotas
and subsidies—used by the CAPs and an economic analysis of their
effects. Although it draws many examples from France, it reflects the
overall situation in the EC for two reasons. First, almost all other EC
member states (including “free trade–minded” countries, such as Britain)
have adopted or maintained audiovisual measures relatively similar to
the French ones.3 Second, the complex process of generating European,
“supra-national” regulations is further eroding differences among mem-
ber states. For instance, in November 1998, the French TV regulator
(Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel [CSA]) decided not to impose
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French legal constraints on TV channels from other EC member states
but to submit them to the EC regime.
Quotas: A bout de souffle. The Television Without Frontiers (TWF)
European Directive (adopted in 1989 and amended on June 30, 1997 by
the European Directive 97/36/EC) imposes “broadcast” quotas based on
film nationality. It stipulates “that broadcasters reserve for European works
. . . a majority proportion of their transmission time, excluding the time
appointed to news, sports events, games, advertising, teletext services and
teleshopping.” The Directive, however, specifies that “member-states shall
ensure this principle where practicable and by appropriate means.”4 These
quotas are rigidly enforced in certain member states (for example, France)
and more subtly implemented in the other member states—but not neces-
sarily with less consequences, as best illustrated by the almost identical
shares of U.S. fiction TV shows in Britain and France.5
Broadcast quotas are combined with other quantitative restrictions in
certain member states. In France, for instance, “global” quotas limit the
total number of films that can be broadcast per year, and time-specific quo-
tas prohibit the broadcasting of films on most TV channels on certain days
and hours. These quotas are set to protect cinemas from competition by TV
channels.6 Quotas on investments require every TV channel to invest a
share of its resources in film production by “prepurchasing” or “coproduc-
ing” films, that is, 3 percent of the net turnover for French TV channels, 20
percent in the Canal Plus case (out of which 9 percent are French films).
Furthermore, there are additional rules imposing constraints on how
quickly a movie done for theaters can be programmed on TV channels and
sold as videos. These rules (which have been loosened in recent years) have
the same effect as quotas; that is, they artificially segment markets.
From an economic perspective, the key question is whether or not
these quotas are binding. The answer is no for the French quotas on the
total number of films that can be broadcast annually. These quotas have
been substantially increased over time, and they are close to the number
of broadcast films in EC member states not enforcing such a restriction.
However, the answer is yes for EC-based broadcast quotas on U.S. films.
For example, these quotas are strongly binding in France, where U.S.
films have a market share greater than 40 percent (ranging from 53 to 63
percent during the 1990s) in cinemas where French viewers can make
free choices.7 Similarly, investment quotas that contribute to increased
production of French films are binding.
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However, these instruments of protection have not had the expected pos-
itive impact on French films. For instance, not enough French films are pro-
duced to meet the quota of French films to be broadcast during TV prime
time. From 1994 to 2001, there have been, on average, only eleven French
films per year having enough success in cinemas (more than one million
viewers) to be candidates for broadcast during prime time—compared with
an average of twenty-four U.S. films. As a result, TV channels increasingly
show reruns of old French films (the rerun rate has increased from less than
60 percent in the 1980s to 70 percent in the 1990s) to meet the annual 40
percent quota of French films and fiction TV works—relegating recent
French films to late or early hours of the day.
Subsidies: Men in Black. Table 9 shows that all EC member states imple-
ment massive subsidy schemes. In 2000, with supports amounting to
368 million euros for films and audiovisual works (films made for TV
channels in EC jargon), France outdistanced other European countries.
(In what follows, euros will be used for ECUs as well as for euros.) Since
1997, the gap has somewhat narrowed. In 2000, the amount of the
TABLE 9
EUROPEAN PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR FILM AND AUDIOVISUAL WORKS, 2000
Total Productiona Distribution Exploitation
million euros %  %  %  
Austria 16.4  90 10   
Belgium 18.4  92.4 7.6   
Britain 57.5  96.5 1 2.5  
Denmark 23.3  91 8.2 0.8  
Finland 12.4  90 4.4 5.6  
France 368.1  82.1 5.4 12.5 
Germany 149.6  90 8.4 1.6  
Greece 3.8  100 0 0 
Ireland 8  99 1 0  
Italy 94.5  89.9 10.1 0 
Netherlands 34  99.4 0.6 0  
Portugal 17.2  92.2 0 7.3  
Spain 80  98.6 1.1 0.3  
Sweden 36.7  78 22 b
EC-15 921.3  88.3 6.2 5.5        
SOURCE: European Audiovisual Observatory, Statistical Yearbook 2002, vol. 3 (Strasbourg, France), 102.
a. Includes scriptwriting and development schemes and project development.
b. Support for exhibition is included in distribution.     
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French subsidies represented 39.9 percent of total European funds, com-
pared with 45.6 percent in 1997. Nevertheless, French public support
still exceeds by far the support granted by Germany, Britain, Italy, and
Spain, all countries known for their interventionist policies on this mat-
ter. Note that table 9 underestimates the differences between France and
the other EC member states because the figures provided on French pub-
lic support do not fully take into account the implicit support imposed
by the investment quota regime (which is much more important in
France than in any other European country). 
Table 10 addresses this implicit subsidy issue for French films
(excluding audiovisual works) for the period between 1995 and 2000.8
It gives two estimates of the subsidization rate, which differ with their
treatment of the income that film producers derive from TV purchases.
Estimate 1 includes in the film industry income the full expenses on
purchased and prepurchased films made by TV channels. However, part
of these TV purchases are imposed by the regulatory framework, namely
broadcasting and investment quotas. This component should thus be
considered as implicit subsidies granted by TV channels to French film
producers. Because it ignores this more appropriate interpretation, esti-
mate 1 undervalues somewhat the subsidization rate to French films.
Estimate 2 aims to correct this bias by using Cocq’s estimate,9 according
to which 41 percent of broadcasters’ investments are imposed by the
existing regulations. Consequently, 131.2 million euros should be
deducted from the income from TV channels and reported as public
support.
Table 10 suggests that during the late 1990s, the subsidization rate of
the French cinema exceeded 50 percent, according to the unbiased 
TABLE 10
SUBSIDIZATION RATES OF THE FRENCH FILM INDUSTRY, 1995–2000
M€, annual average during the period Estimate 1 Estimate 2  
Public aid to cinema 187.7 318.9  
Movie theater income of French films 259.6 259.6  
TV income of French films 326.6 195.4  
Video income of French films 69.3 69.3 
Export income of French films 82 82  
Average subsidies rate of French films  25.5% 52.6%  
SOURCE: Centre National de la Cinématographie, Annual Reports, 1995–2000 (Paris); authors’ calculations.
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estimate 2. However, this rate is likely to be substantially lower than the
true rate because it is based on film revenues (and not on the added
value, as it should be) and it does not take into account a variety of
funds, in particular SOFICA’s tax-based incentive scheme for private
investment in film production, and—much more importantly—Canal
Plus monopoly rent. With an average spending of 130 million euros per
year in the late 1990s, Canal Plus alone contributed to two-thirds of all
funds flowing from investment quotas.10 This huge investment require-
ment has been explicitly conceived as a counterpart of the monopoly
granted to Canal Plus for broadcasting films in pay TV. In the 1990s, the
monopoly rents that Canal Plus could extract from its French TV view-
ers was estimated to be 300 million euros per year, meaning that almost
half of Canal Plus monopoly rents is an indirect way of taxing French TV
viewers in order to subsidize French film producers.11 If one adds all
these subsidies, the rate of subsidization of French films is close to 100
percent.
This regime deserves a last, but crucial, observation. Skyrocketing
subsidies have profoundly shaped film production away from culture.
The standardization of “automatic” production subsidies calculated on
admissions in cinemas, introduced by the “Plan Lang” (from former
Culture Minister Jack Lang) in 1989, has fueled the production of
French “entertainment” films mimicking high-cost Hollywood movies.
Combined with broadcast quotas, such subsidies have protected
French-made Hollywood clones from their Hollywood competitors,
leading to an accelerated “Americanization” of the French film output
and hurting the production of cultural films—all the more because the
very limited subsidies for such movies are granted by quasi-corporatist
committees favoring the fashion of the time more than creativity.
Winners and Losers: Four Funerals and a Wedding
European CAPs are so complex that operators in audiovisual markets
want to stick to the status quo simply because they cannot assess
whether they will lose or gain in the case of reforms. Fear of being
among the net losers of liberalization nurtures everybody’s hostility to
reforms, whereas the complexity of the protection is likely to have gen-
erated so many inefficiencies that everybody is already a net loser. For
instance, the French version of the EC system of quotas, subsidies, and
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monopoly rents (created, then taxed and transferred) involves at least 
six different participants: cinema owners, film producers (foreign,
French successful, and French unsuccessful), broadcasters, and French
consumers.
Most of these operators do not know whether the existing regime
makes them net winners or losers. Cinema owners benefit from the
quota on the total number of films to be broadcast and from the subsi-
dies (both increase demand for cinema seats), whereas they bear the cost
of the 11 percent seat tax, which reduces this demand. U.S. filmmakers
face the seat tax and the 40 percent broadcast quota on U.S. films (both
reduce the demand of their films), but they recoup a portion of the seat
tax to the extent that they are the main beneficiaries of the relatively
comfortable French cinemas. EC filmmakers face the same situation as
U.S. film producers, with two differences: They have access to French
subsidies, but they are unlikely to benefit from possible rents associated
with the quota on EC films (their demand by French TV viewers is too
limited). Successful French film producers share many features with EC
filmmakers, and they get even more subsidies, leaving them with the
impression of being major beneficiaries (but perhaps wrongly, because
their situation in the absence of CAPs could be even better).
Broadcasters are “taxed” by investment quotas (and by taxes or fees on
their advertising resources), but they may benefit from these quotas to
the extent that they provide some flexibility in programming. Canal Plus
is an extreme case, with huge monopoly rents constrained by investment
quotas (with the rise of its competitor TPS increasingly deteriorating
Canal Plus’s net situation to the point that it could become a net loser in
the future).
There is only one group of sure winners and one group of sure losers.
Unsuccessful French filmmakers are unambiguously net winners: They are
not hurt by the seat tax (nobody wants to see their movies), and they are fully
subsidized. The larger their budgets are, the more they are winners. Ironically,
big-budget unsuccessful French-made clones of Hollywood films get the best
of the EC-French system. By contrast, the viewers of French films and the
French taxpayers are unambiguously net losers. They are taxed directly
(when funding subsidies) or indirectly (when going to movie cinemas or
when subscribing to Canal Plus), and French viewers who want to see U.S.
films are hurt by restrictions on these films, whereas French viewers inter-
ested in cultural films are hurt by minimal public support for this category of
films.
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A System Slowly Losing Its Support: Titanic, Part II
In the late 1990s, the perception of the CAPs enforced in some member
states since the early 1980s, and generalized with the 1989 TWF
European Directive, dramatically changed. A profound sense of dissatis-
faction has emerged in all the member states, particularly in those imple-
menting strict CAPs, such as France. What follows documents this
evolution, underlining the fact that the much-publicized statement made
in December 2001 by Jean-Marie Messier, then head of Vivendi-Universal,
that “the Franco-French cultural exception is over,” is the end result of a
long process.
The unfairness of certain rules (and the ease with which they can be
manipulated by committees) has been the first source of increasing criti-
cism, as illustrated by the disputes on rules of origin discussed previously.
A few years ago, movies unduly classified as French films were denounced
in carefully balanced terms by Cour des Comptes but with no public
echo.12 In 1997, the above-mentioned highly controversial case of The Fifth
Element was widely covered by the film specialized press (which is closely
following the ongoing legal battle).
In 1998, the procedure for granting French origin to movies was
reformed, with the language criterion losing some of its influence. But the
changes have only generated new problems, as illustrated by a few recent
cases. In 2000, a Japanese-made cartoon was presented as a French
movie, fueling fierce criticisms in Le Monde.13 More recently, the film Un
long dimanche de fiançailles, directed by Jean-Pierre Jeunet (the director of
the very successful Le fabuleux destin d’Amélie Poulain), almost did not
receive French origin—despite the fact that it was shot in French and in
France, with French actors—because the producer of the film
(Production 2003) was a 40 percent subsidiary of the U.S. firm Warner.14
Opponents to granting French origin to the movie in question argued
that providing French subsidies to subsidiaries of U.S. filmmakers signi-
fied the end of the French cultural exception. Meanwhile, the movie
Alexander the Great by Oliver Stone (a U.S. director with a French pass-
port) was shot in English, with U.S. and British actors, but received
French origin without problem, even though it was funded by the French
firm Pathé only up to 20 percent.
Dissatisfaction has then grown concerning the production perform-
ance of the CAPs. During the early years of the system (the 1980s), the
high number of films produced was perceived as a sign of success of the
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French audiovisual policy—it was an essential argument for “selling” the
French regime to the other EC member states. Of course, the fact that
French film production remained high—while film production was
declining (sometimes dramatically) in other EC member states—simply
mirrored the fact that more French public money was made available to
filmmakers and spent by them (once again, not necessarily for a cultural
purpose). As time went on and other EC member states implemented
their own version of the CAPs, their film industries began to produce
roughly the same number of films as France (between 80 and 130 films
per year for the largest member states), leading to the realization in
Europe that this indicator was largely meaningless.15
The disenchantment was then followed by a spreading recognition of
the uselessness of broadcast quotas in Europe, as underlined by the EC
Commission: “There [is] a pretty general consensus that broadcast quo-
tas no longer suited the new environment.”16 This perception has pene-
trated even the member states that have been historically the most
attached to this instrument. A series of interviews about audiovisual reg-
ulations before the Seattle WTO Ministerial revealed a definite change of
tone in France.17 Patrick Le Lay, head of the largest (private) TV channel,
TF1, was very clear about the fact that quotas have been made “obsolete”
by digitalization and the Internet, whereas Marc Tessier, head of the pub-
lic channel France Télévision, and Pierre Lescure, head of Canal Plus,
were in favor of “more flexibility” of the existing regime, leaving only
Rémy Sautter, head of CLT-UFA, in favor of quotas (but not of subsidies).
Declining public support for the quota regime in recent years mirrors
the increasing share of foreign films in cinema admissions. Until the late
1990s, the diverging evolutions of the shares of U.S. and domestic films in
France and other European countries (see table 11) were perceived as the
sign of success of the French film policy. In fact, however, as said above, the
high market share of domestic films in France was the mere consequence
of the massive French subsidies, relative to the support granted by other
countries. 
However, this difference has been vanishing during recent years, and
market shares of films by nationality tend to converge in all EC member
states (see table 12). The same can be said for the market shares for
domestic films (the dubious classification of The Fifth Element as a French
film increases the 1997 French film market share in France by 5 per-
centage points), and the recognition of a “commercial rout” in 1999 has
been widely acknowledged in the French press.18
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A newly emerging source of dissatisfaction in France is the role of
subsidies. Until the very early 2000s, criticisms had been limited to the
subsidy pattern, with certain observers finding the subsidy share granted
to distribution to be excessive, with a notable exception in a weekly
newspaper.19 But sweeping criticism erupted unexpectedly with a hot
debate between directors and film critics. In a paper published in one of
the major French newspapers, certain directors bitterly accused film
TABLE 11
EC AUDIOVISUAL MARKETS: CINEMAS, TV CHANNELS, AND VIDEOS,
1996–1997
Theatersa TV channelsb Videos______________ ______________ ______________
U.S. VCR
U.S. EC U.S. fiction penetration Blank
films films films works ratec cassettesd
1994–97 1997 1996 1996 1997 1997  
Austria —  0.0 64.6 26.6  75.3 4.7  
Belgium 71.9 0.1  34.1 31.1  68.4 4.1  
Britain 80.5 4.8 e 75.3 19.8  83.0 3.1  
Denmark 70.2 0.2  65.6 27.4  79.0 5.0  
Finland 72.7 0.1  67.0 14.8  72.2 4.4  
France 55.7 10.2  36.2 18.9 77.5 6.3  
Germany 78.6 3.7  65.2 35.5  77.3 3.4  
Greece — 0.0  — 20.2 55.7 1.5  
Ireland — 0.0  — 27.1  72.7 2.1  
Italy 59.9 2.2  61.6 23.6  59.2 2.3 
Netherlands 86.6 0.2  72.4 22.7  67.3 4.0  
Portugal 80.8 0.1 — 19.0  52.0 1.3  
Spain 72.7 1.9 69.0 28.1  72.1 1.9  
Sweden 67.2 0.4 — 29.7  79.2 4.9  
EC f 72.4 1.7 61.1 24.6 73.6 3.5 
United States 95.4 —  — —  92.8 —  
Japan 41.3 — — — 90.8 — 
SOURCE: European Audiovisual Observatory, Statistical Yearbook 1998, 1999 (Strasbourg, 
France). 
a. In percentage of total entrances.
b. In percentage of hours broadcasted (weighted by audience).
Data for U.S. films are available only for 1996 (for comparison, data for U.S. fiction 
works for the same year are presented).
c. In percentage of households. 
d. Expenditures in current euro per person. 
e. The 1997 share is 8.7 percent if coproduced British-U.S. films are included as EC films. 
f. EC simple averages of the columns (based on the 15 member states) are indicated by italics.
PREPARING NEGOTIATIONS IN SERVICES    47
critics of “premeditated assassinations” and of wanting “to kill off all
commercial French cinema designed for a mass audience.”20 The article
generated an outcry, which leads to two key observations. First, direc-
tors producing small-budget cultural films did not endorse the stated
accusations (as the quote shows, the article referred to “commercial”
films), whereas directors specializing in “pure” entertainment movies
did not intervene in the controversy. This clear split among directors of
three types of films (“pure” entertainment, cultural, and “in-between”) is
crucial not only because it underlines that problems are concentrated in
the “in-between” segment of the French production, but because, as
argued above, it provides a basis for designing a worldwide acceptable
subsidy regime. Second, the debate offered an opportunity for many
commentators to criticize “a protection of film makers which has
reached such a level that its beneficiaries are no more able to tolerate the
least criticism,”21 at last opening the door to criticisms of the existing
subsidy scheme in the French press.22
Interestingly, doubts on the efficiency of the French subsidy scheme
have very recently begun to emerge among official circles, as best illus-
trated by a very recent report from the French Senate.23
These criticisms have not reached the EC subsidy regime (as distinct
from member states’ subsidies), which is still widely perceived as bene-
ficial despite the fact that the demand for European nondomestic films
in each EC member state (for instance, the demand for EC non-French
films in France) is not only small but also generally declined during the
1990s. This evolution suggests that the EC subsidy regime is self-
destructing because CAPs constitute a barrier to an integrated EC film
market, contrary to its stated objective. This is not surprising. National
subsidies have artificially bolstered film production by “gluing”—the
idea that investments are stuck in each member state, instead of looking
to the best places in Europe—national investments in each member
state. Rather than creating a demand for so-called “European” films,
these “sticky” investments in a member state have been crowding out
films from other EC member states. Ironically, the French film industry
has suffered the largest crowding-out effect. In sharp contrast, the only
EC film industry with growing market shares in the EC is the British
industry, which has been characterized by a much lower level of subsi-
dization for years (to a large extent, forcing it not to mimic U.S. films but
to offer a British touch) and noticeable investments from the U.S. film
industry in recent years.
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TABLE 12
EC AUDIOVISUAL POLICIES: A BARRIER TO A EUROPEAN FILM MARKET
Origin of first-time 
Market share of films from: release feature films
Britain 
(market share of gross box office) Britain____________________________ ____________________________
1992 6.8 90.6 — 1.0 0.1 0.0 11 59.9 — 6.6 0.9 0.9
1993 2.5 94.2 —  0.7 0.0 0.0  10.2 57.2 —  6.4 0.8 0.8
1994 8.8 90.2 —  0.5 0.0 0.0  15.8 58.9 —  5.4 1.3 2.0
1995 10.5 85.2 —  0.5 0.0 0.2  16.3 60.7 —  5.0 1.0 1.7
1996 12.8 81.7 —  0.5 0.0 0.2  18.7 59.8 —  6.6 0.6 0.6
1997 28.1 69.3 —  0.2 0.0 0.0  23.5 57.1 —  5.7 0.6 1.2
1998 14.2 83.7 —  0.2 0.0 0.0  20.5 53.4 —  5.9 1.1 0.0
1999 17.8 80.5 —  0.2 0.1 0.5  23.3 52.8 —  5.3 1.4 0.8
2000 21.4 75.3 —  0.3 0.0 0.0  21.4 51.9 —  6.0 0.5 0.8
Italy 
(market share of gross box office)  Italy____________________________ ____________________________
1992 24.4 59.4 6.1 4.5 0.2 —   26.1 47.8 7.1 6.6 2.3 —
1993 17.3 70.0 4.7 3.4 1.0 —   27.8 52.0 4.2 5.0 1.6 —
1994 23.7 61.1 6.7 3.2 1.8 —   27.5 50.0 5.2 5.5 1.4 —
1995 21.1 63.2 6.4 4.0 0.7 —   22.0 52.5 6.2 6.7 1.2 —
1996 24.9 59.7 5.9 2.5 0.1 —   26.6 48.9 8.3 6.5 0.8 —
1997 32.9 46.7 10.8 4.0 0.4 —   22.9 47.9 9.7 6.8 1.1 —
1998 24.7 63.8 7.4 2.2 0.2 —   24.0 47.8 8.9 8.1 1.6 —
1999 24.1 53.1 13.8 2.7 0.4 —   24.8 43.1 10.9 9.2 1.0 —
2000 17.5 69.6 3.3 5.8 1.1 —  20.1 45.6 —  —  —  —
Spain 
(market share of gross box office)  Spain____________________________ ____________________________
1992 9.3 77.1 3.9 4.0 2.6 1.2  11.3 53.5 6.6 8.8 1.6 6  
1993 8.8 75.7 4.1 3.9 1.5 0.4  18.3 51.3 6.2 7.5 4.9 3.3  
1994 7.1 72.3 8.7 3.2 2.3 0.3  12.8 52.8 8.7 6.1 9.0 2.0  
1995 12.2 71.9 7.3 2.9 1.1 0.6  14.1 45.8 7.9 7.7 10.6 4.1  
1996 9.3 78.2 5.8 2.7 0.4 1.6  17.7 39.5 5.2 6.7 5.2 1.9  
1997 13.1 68.2 12.6 2.6 0.7 0.4  16.6 44.1 9.1 6.0 13.3 2.3  
1998 11.9 78.5 5.8 0.9 0.5 0.3  13.0 47.9 8.0 5.4 13.2 1.8  
1999 13.8 64.4 10.8 3.2 0.6 3.5  17.1 45.1 9.8 7.3 11.7 2.1  
2000 10.0 81.6 3.7 1.6 0.8 0.2 —  —  —  —  —  —
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Regulatory Reforms and Liberalization: Shakespeare in Love
The above evidence leads to the conclusion that domestic regulatory
reforms are much needed. Thus, this section looks at two issues: Why
have almost no reforms been launched? What could be the desirable
reforms?
TABLE 12 (continued)
EC AUDIOVISUAL POLICIES: A BARRIER TO A EUROPEAN FILM MARKET
Origin of first-time 
Market share of films from: release feature films
Germany 
(market share of gross box office) Germany____________________________ ____________________________
1992 9.5 82.8 2.5 2.7 —  0.2  21.9 45.1 7.3 8.7 —  4.2  
1993 7.2 87.8 1.1 2.0 —  0.1  25.5 49.4 5.3 8.0 —  0.4  
1994 10.1 81.6 4.8 1.5 —  0.1  22.8 50.2 6.8 7.2 —  1.1  
1995 6.3 87.1 2.2 1.7 —  0.1  24.2 51.9 5.0 5.0 —  1.5  
1996 15.3 75.1 7.0 1.0 —  0.1  22.3 52.3 4.9 6.3 —  1.0  
1997 17.3 70.5 8.5 2.9 —  0.1  21.3 47.2 8.4 7.3 —  1.0  
1998 8.1 85.4 5.2 0.7 —  0.3  16.9 56.9 6.4 5.4 —  2.4
1999 11.1 78.6 —  0.7 —  —   —  —  —  —  —  —
2000 9.4 81.9 —  0.9 —  —   —  —  —  —  —  — 
France 
(market share of gross box office) France____________________________ ____________________________
1992 35.0 58.2 1.6 —  0.6 0.8  41.6 30.2 3.0 —  1.2 2.5
1993 35.1 57.1 2.7 —  0.3 0.2  38.9 34.1 3.8 —  2.5 1.8  
1994 28.3 60.9 7.0 —  0.5 0.2  35.6 35.9 3.4 —  1.2 2.2  
1995 35.2 53.9 6.5 —  1.1 0.1  36.3 35.0 4.5 —  2.5 2.0  
1996 37.5 54.3 5.1 —  0.4 0.1  38.9 36.3 5.2 —  1.8 1.3  
1997 34.5 52.2 8.9 —  0.2 0.2  38.3 36.8 6.3 —  1.5 3.3  
1998 27.6 63.2 4.5 —  0.2 2.1  38.6 35.5 8.3 —  2.0 1.1  
1999 32.4 53.9 8.7 —  0.6 0.9  39.8 34.1 5.3 —  1.5 2.1  
2000 28.5 62.9 4.7 —  0.6 0.4  38.2 35.7 6.8 —  1.7 1.7  
2001a 41.5 46.4 5.7 —  0.9 0.3  40.3 32.0 6.3 —  2.2 0.8 
SOURCE: European Audiovisual Observatory, Statistical Yearbook 2001 (Strasbourg, France). 
a. Provisional figures.  
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Explaining Inertia: Citizen Kane. There are several explanations of why
almost no reforms have been established. First, there is the sheer impor-
tance of the media for politicians. Media professionals (for example, film
directors and actors) are, by definition, masters of public relations. Their
skills make them particularly apt at exerting powerful pressures on gov-
ernments, as illustrated in 1998 by a few European film directors, who
were able to provide the “coup de grâce” to the OECD-based Multilateral
Agreement on Investment (MAI), despite the fact that it was already clear
that audiovisual services were excluded from the MAI coverage.24
Because audiovisual services are an essential tool of the day-to-day rela-
tions between the “rulers” and the “people,” government officials need
the expertise of media professionals on a regular basis. This gives these
producers much more influence than their economic weight would sug-
gest. (Increases in audiovisual subsidies are significantly correlated with
French major elections.)
Second is the much-entrenched belief that CAPs are necessary for creat-
ing “quality” movies. There is no evidence to support such a belief, as
shown by the two (admittedly crude) indicators for French films. The first
indicator is based on the TV audience. As stressed previously, the lightly
subsidized French films produced before the 1980s attract, even nowadays
(despite the handicap of many reruns), many more viewers during prime
time TV hours than the heavily subsidized films produced during the
1980s and 1990s—such a difference in attractiveness is not observed for
recent U.S. films. The second indicator assumes that the only people who
can recognize the virtues of French cultural films are those who attend film
festivals. If this assumption is correct, the French “share of awards” in the
three major European film festivals (Berlin, Cannes, and Venice) seems a
crude, but acceptable, indicator of the evolution of the quality of French
films. This share has dramatically decreased from roughly 20 percent
(1981–1986) to 8 percent (1987–1994 and 1995–2000), if one does not
include the Cannes Festival. (Including Cannes confirms the decline dur-
ing the two first periods, from 16 percent to 10 percent but shows an
increase to 14 percent during the third period.) All this does not support a
strong correlation between the CAPs and “quality” movies.
These results are not surprising for economists who regard changes in
artistic quality as largely exogenous to public policies. They may even
expect the CAPs to have a negative effect on quality for the following rea-
sons. Broadcast quotas tend to induce TV firms to produce more domes-
tic films only (or essentially) to increase the number of foreign films to be
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broadcast, making quality a marginal preoccupation. Subsidies change
the trade-off between quantity and quality by anesthetizing filmmakers’
risk assessment, as indirectly revealed by the much higher ratio of films
to viewers in France compared with the United States (there are roughly
1.1 films produced per million annual viewers in France, compared with
0.4 films per million in the United States).
Third, the balkanization of EC audiovisual markets by the many quotas,
subsidies, and monopolies (public and private) introduced by the CAPs has
left EC audiovisual firms with two main strategic options. The first is to
replicate the EC system in Central Europe by establishing additional
monopolies—an option relatively easy to implement but with very low
returns (because of the smallness of the available markets) and with the
costs of increasingly hostile environments. (Why should Estonians be
happy to grant monopoly rights and rents to French or German TV firms?)
The alternative option is to become global (world) firms. However, that
requires such large funds that it cannot be done alone by EC audiovisual
firms (which are small and underfunded). Going global makes sense only
for EC audiovisual firms that are part of much larger and diversified com-
panies; however, this option is still very risky, as best illustrated by the inte-
gration of Universal Studios or even Canal Plus in Vivendi.
Last but not least, the absence of proposals for the liberalization of
audiovisual services reflects the above-mentioned fact that audiovisual
services companies do not know whether the existing policies make them
net winners or losers, leaving no constituency for change.
Three Proposals: Le fabuleux destin d’Amélie Poulain. The three
reforms discussed here are a preparatory step for multilateral negotiations
and could improve the situation for both the entertainment- and cultur-
ally oriented audiovisual services sectors among WTO members. The
reforms focus on the EC, but because all the suggestions are consistent
with the letter and, more importantly, the spirit of the WTO, they also
could be considered by other countries. Reforms should aim to eliminate
the waste of European resources for making entertainment and to provide
a much better environment for culture—a de facto, much neglected
aspect in the existing CAPs. 
The first proposal is to dismantle the CAPs quota regime. Justifying this
action in a narrow WTO context—the highly discriminatory content of
this regime—would miss the main reason of such an action: The existing
quota regime is a crucial obstacle to a European integrated film market. As
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discussed previously, such quotas hurt every market participant, except
the producers of bad domestic films. They create monopolies (hence inef-
ficiencies) through price hikes or quantity restrictions, and as a result, they
call for subsidies to be sustainable in the long run (at a large cost to pub-
lic treasuries). The CAPs quota regime could be dismantled in three ways:
merging domestic and other member state film categories into one
(“European”) category in the broadcast quotas, increasing the share of
non-EC films in the broadcast quotas, and reducing the investment quo-
tas (and eliminating the constraints of these quotas). The sequence of
these measures should be examined carefully (ideally, the reduction of the
distortions in the film markets per se should precede the reduction of the
distortions in the investment domain in order to avoid the misallocation
of investment resources in the most protected markets).
The second proposal is to make a distinction between subsidies for enter-
tainment and subsidies for culture, eliminating the former and allowing 
the latter. Eliminating quotas but keeping subsidies for all kinds of films 
(a policy often suggested in Europe) would be inappropriate. The previously
mentioned French debate between directors and critics shows that 
entertainment films can survive without state subsidies, but cultural films
cannot, and the ambiguous case of “in-between” movies is not a serious
obstacle to this distinction because most of these films have little cultural
content. At first glance, such a proposal seems drastic and to have little
chance of succeeding in Europe. However, the situation is changing.
Eroding monopoly rents within member states’ markets (such as for Canal
Plus) will inevitably undermine a large source of subsidies. Declining mar-
ket shares of European films in European markets will force operators in
the film market to recognize that subsidies generate barriers rather than
create a single market.
Subsidies for cultural films do not raise any problem of principle about
their compatibility with the rules of the WTO. The direct and indirect
effects of such subsidies on film trade are minimal because such films tend
to have limited audiences and are not a substitute for entertainment films.
The source of subsidies does not seem to be a serious problem in the WTO
framework. Funding through the general tax system (or a proxy for gen-
eral tax, such as the British National Lottery, which may be seen as superior
to funding through public budget because it is more transparent) is nondis-
criminatory. Funding through a seat tax can be treated as (partially) equiv-
alent to a tariff, which is an instrument easily negotiable in multilateral
trade negotiations.
PREPARING NEGOTIATIONS IN SERVICES    53
Such subsidies raise two problems of implementation. First is the
instrument that will allow their introduction to the WTO framework.
The solution seems to be a “reference paper” defining the conditions of
competition in films, that is, allowing subsidies for cultural films and
prohibiting them for other types of films. The second problem is to pre-
vent filmmakers from improperly using subsidies for films other than
cultural films. Such a problem is not serious in countries acting in good
faith, because the distinction between entertainment and cultural films
is easy to make and because cultural films rarely require large funds. For
instance, French subsidies to cultural films amount (by all possible stan-
dards) to less than 30 percent of the total amount of public subsidies.
But the problem does exist in the absence of good faith behavior by
some WTO members. To monitor this risk, WTO member states should
be requested to notify an agreed international body of their subsidies—
perhaps an embarrassing exercise because it might reveal how amazingly
little countries invest in their culture (and how culture is an excuse for
sheer protectionism of narrow domestic economic interests).
The third proposal deals with the serious, and fundamentally domestic,
issues raised by an efficient regime of subsidies for cultural films, that is, of
an efficient “patronage.” Such issues are completely ignored by the existing
CAPs. To what extent can democratic institutions (that is, elected repre-
sentatives and government officials) and associated bureaucracies (such as
the French Centre National de la Cinématographie) be effective “patrons”?
Being a patron implies the willingness to take risks and be ready to pay for
the possible mistakes and corresponding losses. In democracies, represen-
tatives and government officials are intrinsically reluctant to take risks
because they could be accused of favoritism. In addition, they never pay for
their errors—the taxpayers do. Under these conditions, it is difficult for
public authorities to promote culture directly (except in the narrow sense
of preserving uncontroversial historical items and landmarks).
As a result, a serious treatment of culture in the film industry (as well as
in other arts) requires adequate domestic regulations for art foundations
and for innovative structures for patronage (for example, the British system
of “franchised units”). Each country should make an in-depth examination
of its capacity to provide the appropriate regulations and institutions for the
support of its culture. These are purely domestic problems, and such reg-
ulations and institutions are unlikely to raise a problem with the WTO
principle of nondiscrimination. In fact, a patron of French culture could 
be a U.S. institution or person (as in the late 1800s and early 1900s, with
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the U.S. tycoons and French Impressionists), and filmmakers producing
movies nurtured by and enriching French culture could be natives of other
countries.
In conclusion, none of these three proposals threatens “culture” or 
the WTO. To the contrary, they all offer opportunities to design better
mechanisms for patronage than the defaulting ones on which the existing
protectionist policies rely. The WTO is perfectly fitted for discussing the
issue of culturally oriented subsidies (and other competition-related
issues) in a reference paper specific to audiovisual services. There is no
need to go to another international forum.
Postscript: And the Kiwis Came 
The following postscript addresses four issues that emerged between the
Uruguay and the Doha Rounds—during the late 1990s and early 2000s.
First, during the Uruguay Round, Hollywood was dominant in enter-
tainment movies and fiction TV shows. Today, Hollywood retains its
unique capacity to produce movies that are seen in cinemas all over the
world—it is a major European preconception that Hollywood aims to pro-
duce only “American” movies. However, the situation has evolved in the
fiction TV segment. The existence of a much larger number of European
broadcasters has generated a strong demand for more differentiated pro-
grams based on more local content (local actors, scenery). Because skills for
making fiction TV shows are easier to learn, and digitalization has made
equipment less expensive, TV programs can target national audiences and
still be profitable. To keep their previous positions, U.S. firms have had to
make joint TV shows with non-U.S. firms.
Second, the costs of making Hollywood films in the United States have
skyrocketed, inducing Hollywood filmmakers to shoot their movies out-
side U.S. territory. Requests for protecting audiovisual interests in the
United States against “runaway productions” have emerged, as illustrated
by a dispute between the United States and Canada over American
movies being shot in Canada. What was at stake was (explicitly) “the
small business that supports the film industry, . . . caterers, rental equip-
ment business, electricians, etc.”25 and not, for example, the authors,
directors, actors, and scriptwriters, that is, all the sources of culture.
Third, digitalization has created huge possibilities for creating images,
including “virtual” images, at low cost. Countries that have not previously
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been involved in audiovisual production—but have workers who have
digitalization skills and untapped natural resources—have been able to
attract large productions, as best illustrated by The Lord of the Rings,
which was mostly produced in New Zealand. (Interestingly, this movie is
considered to be of U.S. origin in most countries, but of New Zealand 
origin by the French authorities.) As a result, competition between pos-
sible places to shoot films and fiction TV shows has tremendously
increased.
Fourth, the strengthening of the Internet-based economy has dramati-
cally changed the market prospects for cultural films. The Internet is a very
cheap and widespread means of disseminating cultural films, which, by
nature, tend to attract geographically dispersed audiences. Forces in the EC
that want to extend to Internet-related audiovisual services the barriers and
restrictions imposed on audiovisual services channeled by other means of
communication are suicidal from the cultural point of view. In terms of the
audiovisual services sector, the EC probably has more to gain from an
untaxed and free Internet than the United States does.
Interestingly, all these issues challenge the U.S. comparative advan-
tages in movies shown in cinemas—there is no such thing as producers
with permanent advantages. As a result, they favor situations that can be
seen by negotiators as more “balanced” between market operators in the
United States, the EC, and elsewhere; hence, if more frequent and recog-
nized, these evolving comparative advantages could make negotiations
on audiovisual services at the WTO easier.
